


# **DISPARITIES IN THE SAFETY DEMONSTRATIONS FOR RESEARCH REACTORS AND THE NEED FOR HARMONIZATION**

**H. Abou Yehia and G. Bars (IRSN)**



# CONTENTS

- **Introduction**
- **Disparities observed in the safety analyses, especially in the:**
  - **Approaches and methods**
  - **Envelope accidents**
  - **Data used for source term evaluations**
  - **Thermal-hydraulic calculation codes**
- **Conclusion**

# INTRODUCTION

## (1/2)

- **272 operational research reactors in 58 countries:**
  - **Great diversity in design, power level and operating modes.**
  - **Consistency between the safety principles adopted for the design and safety reassessments.**

# INTRODUCTION

## (2/2)

- **Important disparities in the safety analysis methods, data and computational tools used for similar research reactors.**
- **This may result in different conclusions on the safety level of such reactors.**

# USE OF DIFFERENT METHODS FOR THE SAFETY ANALYSIS (1/3)

- **DETERMINISTIC METHOD:**
  - **Most frequently used method**
  - **Selection of limited number of events for analysis.**
  - **Accidents are postulated without the need to precisely identify their causes.**

# USE OF DIFFERENT METHODS FOR THE SAFETY ANALYSIS (2/3)

- **PRABABILISTIC METHOD:**
  - Often used as a complement to deterministic method.
  - Able to take into account common failure modes.
  - Some uncertainties in the available generic reliability data which could be not valid for a given research reactor.

# USE OF DIFFERENT METHODS FOR THE SAFETY ANALYSIS (3/3)

- **Safety analyses for French research reactors are based mainly on deterministic approach with, however,**
- **probabilistic evaluations concerning external events (air crashes, explosions,...).**

# DISPARITIES IN THE TYPES OF ENVELOPE ACCIDENTS (1/2)

Envelope accidents taken into account in the safety analyses for similar research reactors cover a range including :

- **The meltdown of a fuel element, or**
- **the partial or total meltdown of the reactor core.**



## DISPARITIES IN THE TYPES OF ENVELOPE ACCIDENTS (2/2)

- **Reactivity insertion accidents resulting in core fuel meltdown are not always analyzed in a consistent manner.**
- **The same type of reactivity accident is considered as DBA for some reactors and as BDBA for others.**

## ENVELOPE ACCIDENTS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS (1/4)

Reactor	Fuel (Power)	Envelope accident
<b>BR2</b>	U-Al 93% (100 MW)	200 MJ reactor excursion leading to the core meltdown followed by a water-aluminum interaction (DBA)
<b>FRM II</b>	$U_3Si_2$ 90% (20 MW)	Complete meltdown of the core due to the loss of primary cooling system or to a reactivity accident with failure of shutdown system (BDBA)

## ENVELOPE ACCIDENTS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS (2/4)

<b>Reactor</b>	<b>Fuel (Power)</b>	<b>Envelope accident</b>
<b>HIFAR</b>	U-Al 60%  (10 MW)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Complete meltdown of the core due to a LOCA (MCA)</li> <li>- Complete meltdown of the core with unsealed containment (BDBA)</li> </ul>
<b>OPAL</b>	U <sub>3</sub> Si <sub>2</sub> 19.75%  (20 MW)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Melting of 36 U-Mo targets due to a loss of coolant flow (BDBA)</li> <li>- Melting of 3 fuel plates due to flow blockage (BDBA)</li> </ul>

## ENVELOPE ACCIDENTS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS (3/4)

Reactor	Fuel (Power)	Envelope accident
<b>OSIRIS</b>	$U_3Si_2$ 19.75%  (70 MW)	135 MJ reactor excursion leading to complete meltdown of the core followed by a water-aluminum interaction (DBA)
<b>RHF</b>	U-Al 93%  (57 MW)	- 135 MJ reactor excursion leading to complete meltdown of the core followed by a water-aluminum interaction (DBA)  - Uncovering and complete meltdown of the core (DBA)

## ENVELOPE ACCIDENTS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS (4/4)

Reactor	Fuel (Power)	Envelope accident
<b>RSG-GAS</b>	$U_3Si_2$ 19.75%  (30 MW)	- Meltdown of a fuel element caused by a coolant channel blockage (DBA)  - ATWS leading to the meltdown of 5 fuel elements (BDBA)
<b>SAFARI-1</b>	U-A1 87%- 93%  (20 MW)	Complete meltdown of the core accompanied by the loss of all ventilation systems (MHA)

## ENVELOPE ACCIDENTS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT FOR FRENCH RESEARCH REACTORS (1/2)

- **The DBA taken into account in France for pool type research reactors is a BORAX type explosive reactivity accidents.**
- **Main assumptions:**
  - **complete core meltdown under water**
  - **Energy release of 135 MJ, including 9% in the form of mechanical energy.**

## **ENVELOPE ACCIDENTS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT FOR FRENCH RESEARCH REACTORS (2/2)**

- These assumptions were used for the different research reactors in prescriptive manner for the design of the reactor pool and containment building.**
- Analyses are currently in progress at the IRSN to obtain more precise data on the consequences of explosive reactivity accidents**

# THE NEED FOR HARMONIZATION

**Harmonization is needed for the:**

- **types of envelope accidents to be taken into account for research reactors having similar technical characteristics.**
- **Terminologies used to designate these accidents. \_**



# DISPARITIES IN THE DATA USED FOR SOURCE TERM EVALUATIONS (1/3)

- **Disparities concerning:**
  - **Fission products release fractions from molten fuel into pool water and then into the reactor building atmosphere.**
  - **Hypotheses used to determine the release to the environment.**

## RELEASE FRACTIONS FROM MOLTEN FUEL INTO POOL WATER (1/2)

	BR2	FRM II	OPAL	OSIRIS	RSG- GAS
Kr,Xe	1	1	1	1	1
I	0.5	0.75	0.3	0.8	0.5
Br	0.5	0.75		0.8	0.5
Cs	0.1	0.25	0.3	0.8	0.25
Rb	0.1	0.25	0.3		0.25
Te	0.01	0.001	0.01	0.8	0.25

## RELEASE FRACTIONS FROM MOLTEN FUEL INTO POOL WATER (2/2)

	BR2	FRM II	OPAL	OSIRIS	RSG- GAS
Ru	0.01	0.001	0.01	0.1	
Ba,Rh				0.1	
Sr		0.001		0.1	
Actinides		0.001		0.01	
Lanthanides				0.01	

## RELEASE FRACTIONS FROM POOL WATER INTO THE REACTOR BUILDING ATMOSPHERE (1/2)

	FRM II		OPAL
	prompt release	delayed release	
Kr, Xe	1		1
I	$5 \cdot 10^{-4}$	$5 \cdot 10^{-6}/h$	0.5
Br	$5 \cdot 10^{-4}$	$5 \cdot 10^{-6}/h$	
Cs	$1 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$5 \cdot 10^{-7}/h$	0.01

## RELEASE FRACTIONS FROM THE POOL WATER INTO THE REACTOR BUILDING ATMOSPHERE (2/2)

	OSIRIS		RSG-GAS
	prompt release	delayed release	
Rb	0		$1 \cdot 10^{-5}$
Te	$5 \cdot 10^{-4}$	$5 \cdot 10^{-6} / \text{h}$	$1 \cdot 10^{-5}$
Ru	0		
Sr	0		
Actinides	0		

## RELEASE FRACTIONS IN THE CASE OF CORE MELTDOWN FOLLOWING A LOCA (1/2)

	HIFAR	RHF	SAFARI-1
Noble gases	1	1	1
I	0.3	0.8	1
Br		0.8	
Cs	0.3	0.8	0.163
Te	0.01	0.8	0.192

## RELEASE FRACTIONS IN CASE OF CORE MELTDOWN FOLLOWING A LOCA (2/2)

	HIFAR	RHF	SAFARI-1
Rb	0.3	0.01	
Ru	0.01	0.1	0.005
Ba, Rh, Sr		0.1	
Actinides		0.01	0.1
Other		0.01	

## **DISPARITIES IN THE DATA USED FOR SOURCE TERM EVALUATIONS (2/3)**

**There is a need to:**

- **Examine the possibility of adopting a single conservative database on release fractions to be used for research reactors.**



## **DISPARITIES IN THE DATA USED FOR SOURCE TERM EVALUATIONS (3/3)**

**There is a need to:**

- **Complete experimental data on Fission product release fractions for silicide fuel.**
- **Get such data for the U-Mo fuel currently being qualified for Research reactors.**

# DISPARITIES RELATING TO THERMAL-HYDRAULIC CALCULATIONS (1/2)

- **Diverse thermal-hydraulic codes, originally drawn up for power reactors, were adapted and used, in the safety analyses for research reactors.**
- **Disparities in the mathematical models and correlations used in the different codes.**
- **Disparities in their validation levels.**

## **DISPARITIES RELATING TO THERMAL-HYDRAULIC CALCULATIONS (2/2)**

### **Suggestion for:**

- **Experimental validations with the use of a fuel element instrumented with thermocouples.**
- **Comparative calculations with different codes for a « reference core » case.**

## CONCLUSION (1/2)

**It is important to:**

- **Examine and solve the disparities related to fission product release fractions.**
- **Investigate the possibility of elaborating a common database on this subject.**

## CONCLUSION (2/2)

- **Obtain experimental data on fission product release fractions, in particular for U-Mo**
- **Continue the validation work concerning computational tools.**